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Abstract
We investigate changes in the pricing policies of exporters, including changes in the
exchange rate pass-through elasticity, and changes in the elasticities of variables that affect
the ﬁrm’s markup. We set up a theoretical model of optimal export pricing in order to
illustrate how changes in the pass-through elasticity can emerge together with changes in
other elasticities in the pricing policy. Based on our theoretical formulation, we empirically
study changes in all the elasticities that deﬁne the pricing policy as opposed to focusing
only on the exchange rate pass-through. In the empirical model, we assume that in every
period exporters get to set prices by following either a “high pass-through” or a “low pass-
through” pricing policy. The transition from one policy to the other is governed by a Markov
process whose transition probabilities depend on economic fundamentals. We estimate the
model using data we have collected on 35 lines of imported cars to the US, from seven
exporting countries, for the 1980-2004 period. We ﬁnd that the “low pass-through” regime
is characterized by: a low exchange rate pass-through; a low response to misalignments
in the ﬁrm’s relative price; a low volatility of technology and preference shocks; and a
higher duration than the high pass-through regime. Monetary stability and the market
structure are signiﬁcant factors behind the switching of pricing policies. Ceteris paribus,
monetary stability measured as the cross-country inﬂation differential explains abut 22%
of the year-to-year variation in the exchange rate pass-through coefﬁcient; when measured
by the volatility of the exchange rate, it explains 37%. Market concentration measured by
the Herﬁndahl index explains about 40%.
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11 Introduction
There is a growing empirical literature that documents a decline in the exchange rate pass-
through elasticities in various industries and for a number of countries—see, for example,
Campa and Goldberg (2005) for OECD countries, Frankel et al. (2005) for a large set of
developed and developing countries, and Marazzi and Sheets (2007) for the US economy.
While theoretical studies examine the implications of the decline in the pass-through for
adjustments of external imbalances and monetary policy, the sources of the instability of
the pass-through elasticity are not fully established by empirical studies.
Theoretical studies suggest a number of economic fundamentals that determine an ex-
porting ﬁrm’s optimal degree of exchange rate pass-through. While some of the studies
focus on product or industry speciﬁc characteristics, others highlight the role of macroe-
conomic conditions. Some of the product and/or industry speciﬁc factors that have been
studied are substitutability of the export good—e.g., Giovannini (1988), Donnenfeld and
Zilcha (1991), Friberg (1998), Goldberg and Tille (2005)—, competitive conditions in foreign
markets—e.g., Krugman (1987), Froot and Klemperer (1989)—strategic complementarities
and the market share of the exporting country—e.g., Feenstra et al. (1996), Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2005), Bodnar et al. (2002). The macroeconomic variables that have been
identiﬁed theoretically as important for the degree of pass-through are exchange rate volatil-
ity and inﬂation—Taylor (2000), Devereux et al. (2004). As one or more of these factors vary
across time for different exporters, the pricing policies of exports can change, which in turn
affect the degree of exchange rate pass-through.
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the economic factors that affect the in-
stability of the pricing policies of exporters, using a panel dataset of US automobile imports.
Changes in the pricing policies may imply instability in the pass-through elasticity as well
as instability in the elasticities of the determinants of the ﬁrm’s mark-up.1 The challenge in
disentangling different factors behind changes in the degree of exchange rate pass-through
is that the pricing policies of exporters are unobservable, and they might change along with
other economic factors. Hence, one needs to draw inferences not only about the optimal
pricing rules that the exporters follow, but also about the underlying economic fundamen-
tals that can affect the choice of the pricing rule itself. For that reason, we consider the
1The idea of ﬁrms adjusting their mark-ups to stabilize prices in the face of exchange rate shocks has been
referred to as ”pricing-to-market” following Krugman (1987).
2hidden regime switching methodology by Hamilton (1990) and Hamilton (1996), and its later
extension by Diebold et al. (1993) as the appropriate econometric framework to build infer-
ences about the underlying fundamentals that determine the choice of the pricing policy,
and to simultaneously estimate the elasticities of the pricing policies.
We start by formulating a theoretical model of optimal export pricing decisions where the
exporters optimally choose the degree of exchange rate pass-through as part of the optimal
pricing plan. The optimal policy to choose the degree of exchange rate pass-through is a
function of the volatility of the exchange rate and its correlation with other variables that
determine the optimal price; our results generalize the results of Devereux et al. (2004). The
crucial point in our generalization is to show that the economic fundamentals that deter-
mine the elasticities of the optimal price with respect to variables that determine the ﬁrm’s
markup—such as the price of competitors or consumers’ income—are the same fundamen-
tals that parametrize the optimal policy to choose the degree of exchange rate pass-through.2
Therefore we can establish, for example, that changes in the fundamentals that determine
the elasticity of the optimal price with respect to the price of competitors—i.e., the degree
of strategic complementarities—may induce at the same time changes in the exchange rate
pass-through even if we hold constant the exchange rate volatility. Similar arguments apply
for other variables that determine the ﬁrms’ markup. Hence, instead of focusing only on
the potential changes of the pass-through parameter, we investigate the stability of the full
pricing policies.
The empirical model assumes that in every period exporters set prices by following ei-
ther a “high pass-through” or a “low pass-through” pricing policy. The transition from one
policy to the other is governed by a Markov process whose transition probabilities depend
on economic fundamentals. For the choice of the economic fundamentals, we rely on the
theoretical literature on the determinants of the optimal choice of the exchange rate pass-
through, and consider monetary stability, market concentration and exporting country’s
market share. The actual state of the ﬁrm is unobservable: we only observe the announced
price, but do not observe the pricing regime that it comes from. Following the methodol-
ogy in Diebold et al. (1993), we estimate the probability of being in one regime versus the
other along with the parameters in the pricing equation. The estimated probabilities show
2The key for our results is to assume that the price elasticity of demand is a function of the same variables that
determine the demand itself such as the the relative price of the good, income, etc. Instead, Devereux et al. (2004)
assume a constant price elasticity.
3which factors are signiﬁcant in determining the degree of pass-through. Furthermore, ana-
lyzing the evolution in those factors, we investigate their role in the changes in the average
exchange rate pass-through implied by the model.
Our dataset consists of 35 automobile models from 7 exporting countries, which we have
collected from the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks for the 1980-2004 period. For each model
we observe the manufacturer’s suggested retail price, the number of units imported into the
US, physical characteristics of the speciﬁc model, and location of assembly for the units sold
in the US. The manufacturer’s suggested retail price is the price at the port of entry; thus,
the exchange rate pass-through coefﬁcients that we estimate are at-the-dock rates.3 The
manufacturer’s suggested retail price captures more accurately the behavior of exporters
than the transaction prices since transaction prices are set in part by the dealer. The man-
ufacturer’s suggested retail prices are net of local taxes, transportation costs, or optional
equipment added by the dealer that may contain domestic components; moreover they do
not include variations due to dealers’ discriminatory practices—see e.g., Goldberg (1996).
Our estimations suggest that the low pass-through (high pass-through) regime is char-
acterized by: (i) a low (higher) exchange rate pass-through elasticity of between 10% and
15% depending upon the speciﬁcation (of between 21% and 24%); (ii) lower (higher) sensi-
tivity to misalignments in the ﬁrm’s relative price, with an elasticity of 50% to 62% across
speciﬁcations (between 85% and 92%); that is, the degree of strategic complementarities is
much lower in the low pass-through regime; (iii) lower (higher) volatility of the unobserv-
able shocks—a combination of preference shocks and technology shocks—of about only one
percent of the volatility in the high pass-through regime; and (iv) longer (shorter) average
duration of the adoption of the pricing policy; once a ﬁrm adopts the low pass-through pric-
ing policy it keeps it for between two years and four months and three years and six months
(between one year and ten months and two years and seven months). These ﬁndings are
robust to including different variables in the transition probabilities.
The signiﬁcant factors behind the switching of the pricing polices that we identify are
the inﬂation rate in the US, volatility of the exchange rate, the exporting country’s market
share, and market concentration (measured by the Herﬁndahl index of the industry). Using
the conditional probabilities that we estimate, we build inferences for the fraction of ﬁrms in
3The percentage of exchange rate ﬂuctuations that the exporters choose to transmit is interpreted as the pass-
through “at the dock”. The exchange rate pass-through to the ﬁnal consumption goods can also depend on local
costs. See, for example, Burstein et al. (2003) and Corsetti and Dedola (2004).
4the low pass-through regime for each year in our sample. Hence, we build an inference on
the average exchange rate pass-through for the 1980-2004 horizon. We ﬁnd that, everything
else constant, the cross-country inﬂation differential explains about 22% of the year-to-year
variations in the average exchange rate pass-through coefﬁcient; everything else constant,
the volatility of the exchange rate explains 37%, and the market concentration explains
about 40%; in contrast, the country’s market share variable explains less than 2%. In a
ﬁve year horizon, the percentage due to market concentration falls to 17%, whereas the
percentage due to exchange rate volatility increases to 53%, and the percentage due to the
inﬂation differential does not change by much.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical export pricing
equation that we use in our estimations. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology.
Section 4 describes the sources of our data and the variables that we construct. Section
5 presents and interprets the results. Section 6 discusses the exchange rate pass-through
dynamics for the industry and its decomposition. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Model for Pricing of Exports
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First we illustrate how changes in the pass-through
elasticity can emerge together with changes in other elasticities. Second, we formulate the
pricing equation that will be used in the estimations. For our theoretical illustration we
show that if there are long-run structural changes in the relative price of a ﬁrm (i.e. a shift
in the steady state relative price), the full optimal pricing rule can change including the op-
timal exchange rate indexation rule.4, 5 Hence, there will be a shift in the optimal pricing
rule that will include changes in the exchange rate pass-through, as well as marginal cost
pass-through and the responsiveness of prices to the competitors’ prices—i.e. the degree of
strategic complementarity.6 Our theoretical formulation highlights the importance of study-
ing the changes in the exchange rate pass-through concurrently with potential changes in
the other determinants of the optimal pricing policies. The regime switching framework we
4We do not investigate theoretically the sources of the change in the steady state relative prices. One example
can be a structural change in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, other example could be changes in the growth rate of
nominal marginal costs across foreign and domestic ﬁrms, etc.
5Gopinath et al. (2007) use strategic complementarities in their model to show that medium-run pass-through
can be different than long-run pass-through. In our model, a lower degree of strategic complementarities—perhaps
driven by a higher steady-state relative price—can induce a lower pass-through.
6Formally we deﬁne the degree of strategic complementarities as the elasticity of the optimal price with respect
to the industry price index, assuming it is positive. If the elasticity were negative then the goods would be strategic
substitutes.
5present in the following section allows us to do that.
The exporter’s optimal pricing policy has two components: an optimal preset or baseline
price7, and an optimal degree of indexation of the preset price to the exchange rate surprise—
i.e., the non-expected component of the exchange rate. In particular we assume that in
period t − 1, the exporter optimally chooses and commits to a pricing policy with a baseline
preset price p∗
ℓt, and one out of two possible degrees of indexation of the preset price to the
exchange rate surprises δj ∈ {δL,δH}. As it will become clear later, our optimal indexation
problem allows us to obtain as special case the optimal currency choice rule—producer
currency pricing versus local currency pricing—obtained in Devereux et al. (2004). However,
the general case allows us to demonstrate how changes of steady-state relations, such as
shifts in the steady-state relative prices, can alter all the components of the optimal pricing
rule, including the baseline price and the optimal indexation rule.
Formally, let L be the set of ﬁrms in the US market and let ℓ ∈ L be the index of a foreign
ﬁrm. At time t−1 the foreign ﬁrm ℓ optimally chooses the baseline price for the product that
will be sold at time t, p∗
ℓt, as well as one of two possible degrees of indexation of the preset







where st ≡ et/Et−1et is the exchange rate surprise; et is the exchange rate and Et−1et is
the expected exchange rate conditional on the information available in t − 1. The parameter
δj ∈ {δL,δH} is the degree of indexation of the preset price to the exchange rate surprise, with
δj ∈ [0,1] and δL < δH. The optimal pricing equation dervied below shows that the parameter
δj captures the effects of the exchange rate surprise st on the ﬁnal price, whereas the optimal
baseline preset price p∗
ℓt contains the effects of the expected exchange rate Et−1et.
We assume that the demand for the good ℓ, produced by the ﬁrm ℓ, is a function of its
relative price pℓt
￿
PLt, where PLt is the price index of the industry, and a function of a vector
of variables Yℓt which can include observables such as consumers’ income or unobservables















Q( ) > 0 be the price elasticity of demand.
7Throughout this section we use preset price and baseline price interchangeably.
6Note that in general we assume that the price elasticity is a function of the same variables
than the demand itself.
The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale. In the absence of tech-





t , where ψ∗
ℓt is the nominal marginal cost denom-
inated in producer’s currency and P∗
t is the price index of the foreign consumption basket.8
However, the ﬁrm is subject to exogenous technology shocks z∗










At time t − 1 the producer chooses p∗
ℓt and δj ∈ {δL,δH} to maximize the expected real

























t is the relevant stochastic discount factor between t −1 and t, subject to the trans-
formation (1) and the demand function (2).
We analyze the optimal pricing policy using a second-order Taylor expansion of the proﬁt
function around a steady-state equilibrium. We assume that the steady-state price elasticity
η(
pℓ
PL,Yℓ) is increasing in the steady-state relative price as in Dotsey and King (2005) or Gust
et al. (2006).9. Thus, η1 ≡
∂η( )
∂(pℓ/PL) > 0
2.1 Optimal Preset Price
Let ^ xt ≡ xt−x
x denote percentage deviation of any variable xt from its steady-state x. Sub-
stituting the transformation (1) in the proﬁt function (3) and using a second-order Taylor
expansion of the proﬁt function around a steady-state we can write the problem for the




















































+ t.i.p. + O(||ξ||3)
￿
(4)
where the ωs are positive under the conditions detailed in Table 1, yℓt represents a typical
element of the vector Yℓt, O(||ξ||3) are terms of third order and higher, and t.i.p. are terms
8We denote the variables that belong to the producer’s country with stars, and call them the foreign country
variables. Throughout the paper, the destination country, US, is the domestic country.
9Gust et al. (2006) use a Dotsey-King aggregator in a model that shows that trade integration produces a decline
in the exchange rate pass-through.
7independent of prices.10 As can be seen from the expressions in Table 1, the ωs depend
on the steady state relative prices among other steady-state values. If there is a shift in the
steady state relative prices, the parameters of the optimization problem, ωs, will change.
Therefore, we append a subscript r to denote the set of parameters that are relevant for
a particular steady state of relative prices.11 It is also important to note that ωs are not
functions of the degree of indexation δj, since in steady-state the exchange rate surprise is
equal to one—see Table 1 for details.
[Table 1 about here.]





rEt−1^ et + γ
ψ




r Et−1^ PLt + γ
y













































r . The elasticities in the
optimal baseline price equation, the γs, are functions of relative prices due to the general
demand function that allows for a non-constant price elasticity (we will discuss the CES case



















Consequently, as long as the condition in (6) holds, an exporter acting around a high
(low) relative price steady-state will have a lower (higher) expected exchange rate pass-
through elasticity. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, γe
r = γ
ψ
r . Thus, around a steady-state
equilibrium with high relative prices, the producer not only passes less of the expected de-
viations of the exchange rate but also less of the expected deviations in the marginal cost
10The term t.i.p. resembles the “terms independent of policy” in Woodford (2005).t.i.p. includes ﬁrst- and second-
order terms of variables that the producer takes as given. Thus they vanish from the producer’s ﬁrst-order condi-
tion.
11Of course, we use steady-state relative prices as an illustration, but one can choose other steady-state values
such as the steady-state value of the price elasticity itself (η) to elaborate the argument that we are trying to convey
in this section.
8(relative to the baseline price in an equilibrium with low relative prices). Similarly, we can
show that a sufﬁcient but not necessary condition for γPL





















> 0. This condition states that strong strategic complementarities to-
gether a low relative price ensure that the degree of complementarities is decreasing in
relative prices.
2.2 Optimal Final Price
Now we turn to the optimal choice for the indexation of the baseline price to the exchange
rate surprises. Given the optimal baseline price the producer sets the ﬁnal price as
^ pℓt = δj^ st + ^ p∗
ℓt. (7)
with ^ st = ^ et − Et−1^ et, and ^ p∗
ℓt deﬁned in (5). In order to choose the degree of indexation,
δj ∈ {δL,δH}, the producer compares the expected proﬁts obtained with the two indexation
parameters. Using the second-order Taylor expansion of proﬁts (4), it is straight forward to








that is, if and only if
1
2



























otherwise it chooses δL.
Note that, we can ideate scenarios where the condition above is less likely to hold when
γe
r is smaller. That is, scenarios where the producer that passes through a smaller fraction of
the expected change in the exchange rate onto its price is also more likely to pass-through a





r decrease when the steady-state relative price increases. In our
9sample the average relative price increased by 46% in the period 1994-2004 relative to the
period 1981-1993. However, what pricing policy an exporter is more likely to adopt, given
an evolving economy, is a question better approached empirically as we do in the following
sections.
The optimal baseline price and the optimal indexation for a CES demand function, and
omitting the technology shock, can be obtained as special cases of our speciﬁcation. The
optimal baseline price in that case is ^ p∗
ℓt = Et−1
￿
^ et + ^ ψ∗
t
￿
; that is, γe
ces = 1, γ
ψ




ces = 0. Moreover, considering δH = 1 and δL = 0 the condition above boils down to:
1
2
vart−1(^ et) > −covt−1
￿





The condition above is the same condition for which a ﬁrm chooses producer currency pric-
ing (PCP) in Devereux et al. (2004).12 This is perhaps not surprising if one notes that
with δH = 1 our indexation setup and PCP both imply full exchange rate pass-through:
pℓt = ^ st + p∗




. This result is in line with the equivalence result of Engel
(2006) that shows that the choice of PCP versus LCP is a special case of a ﬁrm that chooses
the optimal indexation of its export price to the exchange rate.
Finally, we can deﬁne the optimal pricing policy that we will use in our empirical frame-
work as
^ pℓt = δrj^ st + γψ
r Et−1 ^ ψℓt + γPL
r Et−1^ PLt + γy
rEt−1^ yℓt − γz
rEt−1^ zℓt, (10)
where ψℓt is the marginal cost in units of the importing country’s currency; this term is
obtained by imposing γe
r = γ
ψ
r . This constraint implies that the exporter transforms the
expected marginal costs in foreign currency to dollars by using the expected exchange rate.
Such constraint can also be found in Feenstra et al. (1996), who impose γe
r = γ
ψ
r , and deﬁne
one pass-through coefﬁcient as both, the marginal cost pass-through and exchange rate
pass-through in their empirical analysis. The ﬁrst term in (10) captures the effects of the
exchange-rate surprise in the exporter’s price, where the chosen degree of indexation δrj
embeds the information on γe
r, and the other parameters, thus we added the subscript r.
We divide the impact of changes in the exchange rate on the optimal price into two
components: the impact of the expected exchange rate and impact of the exchange rate
12Note that cov(ψ,e) here is minus such covariance in Devereux et al. because our deﬁnition of the exchange rate
is the inverse of theirs.
10surprise. Thus we deﬁne the exchange rate pass-through elasticity at the ﬁrm level as
ηℓ ≡
∂^ pℓt




= δrj + γe
r = δrj + γψ
r , (11)
where the ﬁrst term captures the effects of the exchange rate surprise in the exporter’s price,
and the second term captures the effects of the expected changes in the exchange rate.
3 A Regime Switching Model of Price Setting and its Esti-
mation
3.1 Empirical Framework
We use the optimal pricing policy in (10) to build our empirical framework. The previous sec-
tion provided an illustration of shifts in optimal pricing policies, where changes in exchange
rate pass-through emerge together with changes in other elasticities. In the theoretical
derivations, we exempliﬁed a case where the parameters of the pricing policy might change
due to shift in the steady state relative prices. In our empirical application, we generalize
the argument, and we assume that in each period t, the foreign ﬁrm ℓ is subject to a ran-
dom shock ξℓt ∈ {0,1} that triggers one of the two different sets of parameter values in the








ξℓt}, and hence determines the pricing
regime. We assume that the random shock follows a two-state ﬁrst-order Markov process,
whose transition probabilities depend on economic fundamentals. We refer to the two pricing
policies resulting from those sets of parameters as the “high pass-through” pricing regime
and the “low pass-through” pricing regime. The actual state of the ﬁrm ℓ is unobservable
to the econometrician, who only observes the actual price but does not observe the pricing
regime it comes from. Our assumption of a ﬁrst-order Markov process for ξℓt implies history
dependence in the adoption of a particular pricing policy. Thus, estimates of the transition
probability matrix of the Markov process provide estimates of the degree of persistence or
stickiness of the high (low) pass-through pricing regime.
Accordingly, based on (10), we model observed changes in the optimal price denominated
in dollars of the variety ℓ,  ^ pℓt ≡ ^ pℓt − ^ pℓt−1, as:
 ^ pℓt = βs
ξt ^ st + β
ψ
ξt ^ ψℓt + β
PL
ξt ^ PLt +  ^ Y′
ℓtβ
y
ξt + εξℓt, (12)
11where  ^ st is a proxy for the change in the exchange rate surprise;  ^ ψℓt =  {^ ψ∗
ℓt+^ et} is a proxy




r );  ^ PLt is a proxy for the expected change in the average price of the competitors; and
 ^ Yℓt is a column vector of proxies for expected changes in other variables that may affect the
ﬁrm’s markup.13 Section 4 describes in detail how we construct the variables utilized in our
estimations.
The error term εξℓt follows a standard normal distribution, εξℓt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σ2
ξℓt). Note
that the error term εξℓt contains innovations to unobservable technology shocks, ^ z∗
ℓt in equa-
tion (10), as well as innovations to unobservable demand shocks or preference shocks for
which we cannot control for in the vector  ^ Yℓt. Hence, we can only identify the variance σ2
ξℓt
as the variance of an aggregate of both technology and preference innovations.
Following Diebold et al. (1993), we assume that the transition probability matrix that
governs the two-state Markov process ξℓt ∈ {0,1} contains the following elements:
g00
ℓt ≡ Pr(ξℓt = 0|ξℓt−1 = 0) = B(z′
ℓt−1φ0),
g11
ℓt ≡ Pr(ξℓt = 1|ξℓt−1 = 1) = B(z′
ℓt−1φ1), (13)
g01










1+exp(x) is the logistic function, zℓt is a vector of economic variables that deter-
mine the transition probabilities, and the φs are vectors of parameters to be estimated. We
choose the determinants of the transition probabilities, zℓt, based on the theories on optimal
choice of the exchange rate pass-through and optimal choice of the currency denomination
of exports. When zℓt = 1 ∀t, the model reduces to that of Hamilton (1990) with constant
transition probabilities.
13For example, we include ﬁxed effects, oil price shocks and US disposable income in  ^ Yℓt.
123.2 The Log-likelihood Function and Its Estimation
We jointly estimate the parameters in equations (12) and (13) by following closely the EM































ℓt be the indicator function equal to one
if ξℓt = 0 and zero otherwise (independent of ξℓt−1); let I00
ℓt be the indicator function equal to
one if ξℓt−1 = 0 and ξℓt = 0 and zero otherwise. Similarly, let I11
ℓt be equal to one if ξℓt−1 = 1
and ξℓt = 1 and zero otherwise. As a result, we also have I10
ℓt = 1 − I00
ℓt and I01
ℓt = 1 − I11
ℓt .
To simplify the notation below, let yℓt ≡  ^ pℓt be the dependent variable in the price
equation; let Xℓt ≡
￿
 ^ st  ^ ψℓt  ^ PLt  ^ Y′
ℓt
￿′
be the vector of explanatory variables at t in the
pricing equation. Further, denote mτ to be a τ×1 vector of observations of the corresponding
variable m for t = 1,...τ. Thus, y
ℓT is the vector with T observations of our dependent
variable, XℓT is the matrix of explanatory variables in the pricing equation (12), and ZℓT is
the matrix of variables in the probability equations (13). Hence, the matrices y
ℓT, XℓT and
ZℓT represent our data after the appropriate transformations (see Section 4).








































for i = 0,1.
We can conveniently write the contribution of the unit ℓ to the complete-data log-likelihood
function in terms of the indicator function deﬁned above as:
14However we extend their estimators to allow for equality constraints of some parameters across regimes and also
extend their proposed time-series algorithm in a natural fashion to our panel data. A detailed technical appendix
is available upon request.
15It is the complete-data likelihood function in the sense that it contains data in all possible states. That is, the
complete-data likelihood function is what we could formulate if we could observe the pricing policies in all of the
possible states. Of course, this is not feasible since we can only observe the prices ^ pℓt, and we have to make an
































Assuming that the Markov processes ξℓ are independent across units ℓ, we can write the















Since the observed prices come from unobservable states, it is not feasible to construct
the complete-data log-likelihood function. The EM algorithm is a two-step iterative procedure
to maximize the expected complete-data log-likelihood function conditional on the observed
data. It is initiated by assigning initial probabilities for being in each state. In the ﬁrst step
(the expectation step), conditional on the initial guess, inferences on ξℓt are obtained using all
the information in the sample. These inferences are called the smoothed probabilities. Then,
in the second step (maximization), the expected complete-data log likelihood is maximized
with respect to the parameters of the model. The procedure is iterated until θ converges.
Once the estimates of θ are obtained, we can make inferences about the regime that was
more likely to have been in effect in setting the price of a speciﬁc automobile line for a given
year.
We compute the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates following the supplemented
EM algorithm (SEM) of Meng and Rubin (1991). The main idea behind SEM is to ﬁnd the
increased variability due to missing information (in our case unobservable regimes), and add
it to the complete data variance-covariance matrix, which we ﬁnd analytically based on the
second derivatives of the log-likelihood function.16
16See Diebold et al. (1993) for a detailed description of the EM procedure. A technical Appendix describing our
implementation is available upon request. The details on computing the variance-covariance matrix, and the SEM
algorithm can also be found in our technical Appendix.
144 Data Description and Sources
Our data on automobile imports into the US come from Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. Simi-
lar catalog prices for the European market have been used by Goldberg and Verboren (2001)
and Goldberg and Verboren (2005) in order to study price dispersions in local markets and
law of one price. We have collected information on automobile imports for the 1980-2004
period. Although Ward’s Automotive Yearbook has information on more imported automo-
biles, we restrict our attention to 35 lines, see Table 2 for details. Our choice of automobile
models depends on the availability of price and quantity data for the baseline models. Be-
cause we would like to analyze the changes in prices of individual goods and link them to
macroeconomic developments, we look at the models that have information for at least ten
consecutive years. Furthermore, we restrict our choice of models based on the availability
of information on the assembly plant for each model in order to control for marginal costs.17
As a result, we end up with 35 baseline models from seven exporting countries: France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
[Table 2 about here.]
Car prices. As our dependent variable, we use the manufacturer’s suggested retail price in
US dollars at the port of entry; thus, the pass-though coefﬁcients we estimate is at the dock
rates and not pass-through to the ﬁnal consumer price.18 The manufacturer’s suggested
retail price captures more accurately the behavior of exporters than the transaction prices
since transaction prices are set in part by the dealer. As documented in Goldberg (1996)
transaction prices include discriminatory practices based on the characteristics of the pur-
chase transaction such as ﬁrst-time buyer, trade-in and ﬁnancing through the dealer. More-
over, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) ﬁnd evidence of dealers’ discriminatory practices based on
the consumers’ characteristics.
Our prices: (i) do not include destination charges19; (ii) do not include domestic costs
17Some car models in our sample are assembled in more than one location to be sold in different markets; we
have information on the location of the assembly plants for those units sold in the US. As detailed below, we are
as careful as possible when measuring marginal cost since as Gron and Swenson (1996) point out: accounting for
factor-market decisions of ﬁrms is important in measuring exchange rate pass-through.
18See e.g., Nakamura (2007) and Hellerstein (2005) for the impact of local costs on the incompleteness of pass-
through to the ﬁnal consumer prices.
19After 1990, Wards Automotive Yearbook reports prices including the destination charges. For those years, we
collected the information on destination charges from the Market Data Book, and subtracted them from the reported
prices. Destination charges are typically ﬂat rates set equal for all models within a brand; thus, they do not generate
much variation in the prices.
15added by the dealer through optional equipment; (iii) do not include potential dealers’ dis-
criminatory practices; (iv) do not include state or local taxes; and (v) include ocean freight
and US import duty.
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook provides information on the physical attributes, segment
and sales of each model. The physical attributes include engine speciﬁcations (size, horse
power, cylinders, etc.) and dimensions (height, weight, length). We use the information on
the physical characteristics of the car to adjust the prices for quality improvements over
time, and use the quality-adjusted prices in our estimations. To obtain the quality-adjusted
prices, we regress original prices (in logs) on the ratio of horse-power to car weight and
eliminate the systematic component.
Exchange rate surprise. Except for car prices, all the other variables used as regressors
in the pricing and the probability equations are constructed from monthly series so that the
information set corresponds to the information set available to the exporter at the time of
the price announcement. The model year runs from October to September of the following
year. Hence, we construct a proxy for the expected exchange rate variable as an average of
monthly nominal market rates (ofﬁcial rates if market rates are not available) over the past
two model years (source: International Financial Statistics, IMF). The exchange rate surprise
variable is constructed by taking away our proxy for the expected exchange rate from the
exchange rate of October—that is, the exchange rate available at the beginning of the model
year.20
Marginal cost. As a proxy for the expected marginal cost, we use the monthly manufac-
turing wage rates (reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) of the country where the
assembly plant is located, convert them to dollar terms using the monthly exchange rates,
and construct the averages over the past two model years; consistently with the construc-
tion of the expected exchange rate. For 28 of the models in our sample Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook reports the location of the assembly plant as the manufacturer’s country of origin,
20We also constructed the expected exchange rate as an average over the past 12 and 36 months; moreover
we additionally constructed the exchange rate surprise based on the exchange rate of September. The results do
not change from the ones presented in the next section. Furthermore, we can also construct the exchange rate
surprise measure by subtracting the forward exchange rate from the spot rate. The forward rates are available
only from 1984 for most of the countries in our sample, from 1985 for Sweden and from 2002 for South Korea
(source: Reuters and Barclays Bank, Datastream). Using this alternative measure would require us to drop one
ﬁfth of the observations. Given that the correlation between our measure of the exchange rate surprises and the one
constructed with the forward rates is 0.9636, we choose to keep the maximum available number of observations,
and use the former measure in our analysis.
16see Table 2. Seven models in our sample, are assembled in the US. For those seven models
we follow Gron and Swenson (1996) in that we use a weighted average of the manufacturing
wage rates in the US and the producer’s country of origin. The weights are percentages of
the dollar value of foreign and US inputs in the total value of inputs reported by the Foreign
Trade Zones Board.21
Competitors’ prices. We use monthly information on the US CPI of new cars (source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics) to build a proxy for the expected change in prices of competitors.
Consistently with other proxies for the expected variables, we take the average over the 24
months corresponding to the previous two model years.
Market shares, Herﬁndahl index and country shares. From the Ward’s Automotive Year-
book, we have information on the quantity of all the different automobile lines (domestic
and imported) that were sold in a given year. Using the quantity information, we build a
Herﬁndahl index to measure market concentration. Moreover, we use the data on quantity
of total imports from a particular country to construct the total market share of the exporting
countries. As suggested by Feenstra et al. (1996) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005),
the exporting country’s market share is deﬁned as quantity of exports by a country to the
US as a ratio of total new automobile imports in the US.
Inﬂation and exchange rate volatility. The inﬂation variable is the 24-month average
of annualized inﬂation rates calculated from consumer price indices over the previous two
model years. Finally, our proxy for exchange rate volatility is the 24-month average of
monthly squared changes in the log of the exchange rate during the two previous model
years. The CPIs and exchange rates come from the International Financial Statistics, IMF.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we present the estimates of the pricing policies deﬁned by equations (12) and
(13) using our panel data of prices of 35 narrowly deﬁned car models imported to the US
21Each Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) reports the dollar value of inputs from domestic sources and the dollar value of
foreign inputs. We use that information to construct the weights in the marginal cost. We are able to match the
speciﬁc models to a particular FTZ using the location of the assembly plant.
17that covers the period 1980-2004 for seven exporting countries: England, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Korea and Sweden.
Our strategy in the sequence of models is ﬁrst to keep the transition probabilities con-
stant as in Hamilton (1990), and discuss the dimensions in which the “low pass-through”
regime differs from the “high pass-through” regime. Next, we consider the fundamental
variables that various theories have identiﬁed as important determinants for the choice of
currency denomination of exports and the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Hence, we
allow for time-varying transition probabilities as in Diebold et al. (1993), and discuss the
signiﬁcance of various economic indicators in the light of our estimation results.
5.1 Constant Transition Probabilities
As highlighted in equation (12), we allow the optimal export price to respond to changes in
the exchange rate surprise, expected changes in marginal cost, and to expected changes in
the prices of competitors; Section 4 describes how we construct proxies for such variables.
We also control for the automobile line speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and US disposable income.22
In preliminary speciﬁcations, we used likelihood ratio tests to investigate the equality of
marginal cost and disposable income coefﬁcients across regimes, and we ﬁnd that we cannot
reject the cross-regime equality of the parameters. Therefore, we only report the constrained
results, and provide the likelihood ratio statistics for the validity of the constraints in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here.]
As in Hamilton (1990), the transition probabilities in (13) are constant.23 The parameter
estimates, standard errors and some statistics for the model with constant transition prob-
abilities are reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. This ﬁrst speciﬁcation with constant
transition probabilities shows four key robust results that also hold for the other speciﬁca-
tions presented in Table 3:
• First, as mentioned in Section 2.2, we decompose the effects of the exchange rate on
prices into two terms: the effect of the expected exchange rate that works through the
exchange-rate-adjusted marginal cost and the effect of the exchange rate surprise. We
22In an alternative speciﬁcation, we have also controlled for oil price shocks. The results look very similar, and
are available upon request.
23For the speciﬁcation of the constant transition probability if we include segment dummies that correspond to
luxury, medium and small cars, instead of a single constant, our conclusions below do not change.
18obtain two statistically different and highly signiﬁcant exchange-rate surprise pass-
through coefﬁcients—see the standard errors and the likelihood ratio test in Table 3.
While the exchange-rate surprise pass-through is 4.92% in the “low pass-through”
(LPT) regime, it is 14.87% in the “high pass-through” (HPT) regime. The component
associated to the expected exchange rate and the marginal cost pass-through is 6.9%
and we can not reject the null hypothesis that they are equal across regimes. These
estimations amount to a total exchange rate pass-through, as deﬁned by equation (11),
of 11.82% in the LPT regime and of 21.77% in the HPT regime.
• Second, the LPT regime is also characterized by lower sensitivity to changes in the
competitors’ prices measured by the US CPI of new cars; that is, the degree of strategic
complementarities is substantially different across regimes. Everything else constant,
in the LPT regime a one percent increase in the average competitors’ prices increases
the average price of imported cars by 0.50%, whereas in the HPT regime it causes an
increase of 0.86%. That is, in the LPT regime an increase in the average price of com-
petitors reduces the ﬁrm’s relative price; whereas in the HPT regime the exporter’s price
responds with a magnitude that leaves the relative price almost unchanged; indeed, we
can not reject the hypothesis that the relative price remains unchanged.
• Third, the joint volatility of technology and preference shocks, measured by the variance
of the error term in the pricing equations, varies substantially across regimes. In
the LPT the variance is ^ σ2
0 = 0.0002, whereas in the HPT regime it is ^ σ2
1 = 0.0128.24
Thus, in states of the economy where exporters are faced with a mix of preference and
technology shocks with low volatility (LPT), they smooth further prices by passing a
lower percentage of changes in both, exchange rates and competitors’ prices; therefore,
the LPT regime is consistent with an state of the economy with stickier prices.25 ,26
• Fourth, the estimated probabilities ^ g00 and ^ g11 in equation (13) predict a slightly higher
duration of the LPT regime. The average duration of the LPT regime of 2.73 years,
whereas the duration of the HPT regime is 2.5 years.27
24As a reference, business cycle models for the US estimate the variance of technology shocks in the US around
0.00008 and preference shocks around 0.001. Our estimates of σs jointly account for both, technology shocks in
the exporter’s country and preference shocks in the US.
25Gopinath et al. (2007) and Devereux and Yetman (2002) study the effects of sticky prices in the exchange rate
pass-through.
26These results hold even after controlling for oil price shocks.
27The expected duration is calculated using 1
1− ¯ gii where ¯ gii is the average predicted probability for regime i = 0,1
for the case of time varying probabilities.
19While tests about the existence of two regimes versus one regime are not fully developed
in the literature at this time—see discussion in Hamilton (2008) and Hamilton (1996)—, the
three signiﬁcantly different coefﬁcients we identify exposes the instability of the whole export
pricing policy, and not only instability in the pass-through coefﬁcient.
Although this ﬁrst speciﬁcation with constant transition probabilities is illustrative, and
the results discussed above hold robustly, there are theoretical arguments to believe that
the transition probabilities across the pricing regimes are not constant over time, but vary
with macroeconomic and/or microeconomic conditions. For example, Section 2 shows that
the rule to optimally choose the degree of indexation to the exchange rate surprise is a
function of the expected volatility of the exchange rate, and some covariances as described
in equation (8). We explore some of those theoretical arguments in the next subsection.
5.2 Economic Factors as Drivers of Transition Probabilities
The theoretical literature on export pricing suggests a diverse set of variables for the de-
termination of the optimal degree of exchange rate pass-through. While a strand of the
literature focuses on ﬁrm speciﬁc and industry speciﬁc factors affecting the ﬁrms’ decisions,
other studies focus on country speciﬁc factors or macroeconomic conditions. Each of the
factors can affect the likelihood of the price being in one of the two regimes. By allowing the
transition probabilities to be functions of one or more of these factors, we investigate their
signiﬁcance in the export pricing and pass-through decisions.
To clarify the interpretation of our estimates of the conditional probabilities (13), and to
shed some light on the relevance of the economic factors for the pass-through, we consider
the following. Assume that there is a continuum of mass one of ﬁrms exporting to the US;
out of that mass of ﬁrms, the fraction Λt is subject to the LPT state in t and a mass (1 − Λt)
is subject to the HPT state. Without loss of generality, let us deﬁne ξt = 0 as the “low pass-
through regime.” Recall that g00
t deﬁned in equation (13) is the probability of a ﬁrm acting
under the LPT state in t given that it was in the same state in t − 1; and (1 − g11
t ) = g01
t is
the transition probability of a ﬁrm switching from the HPT state in t − 1 to the LPT state in
t. Thus, in this setting, the evolution of the mass of ﬁrms in the LPT state is given by
Λt = Λt−1g
00
t + (1 − Λt−1)(1 − g
11
t ), (14)
20where the transition probabilities g00
t and g11
t deﬁned by (13) are functions of economic
fundamentals. Given the initial condition Λ−1, the dynamics of the fraction of ﬁrms in the
low pass-through regime is driven by the transition probabilities g00
t and g11
t .28
The major factors that we focus on in our estimations of the pricing equations (12) with
time-varying transition probabilities (13) are: industry concentration, exporting country’s
market share and monetary stability. Each of these factors have been theoretically shown
to be important in the pass-through decisions of the exporting ﬁrms.
5.2.1 Market concentration in the Industry
Setting export prices based on competitive conditions in the destination market has been
called “pricing-to-market” by Krugman (1987). Pricing to market, and the related relation-
ship between exchange rate pass-through, proﬁt margins and the degree of competition in
the destination market has been studied in Mann (1986), Marston (1990) and Knetter (1993)
among many others. The idea is that higher competition increases the likelihood of the ex-
porters to absorb more of the ﬂuctuations in the exchange rates, and to vary their mark-ups
accordingly. To capture the effects of the degree of competition in the US automobile market
on the pricing decisions of the exporters, we consider the change in the Herﬁndahl index for
the US automobile market as a determinant of the transition probabilities.29
The second column of estimates in Table 3 shows that the market concentration is a
statistically signiﬁcant determinant of both transition probabilities g00
ℓt and g11
ℓt . To make
clear the economic interpretation of the estimated coefﬁcients in the transition probabilities,
we construct the percentage of ﬁrms in the LPT state using equation (14). Panel A of Figure 1
shows that the Herﬁndahl index has a downward trend in the period 1981-2004—implying
a less concentrated market overall. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the implied percentage
of ﬁrms in the LPT regime is on average slightly higher after 1990. This suggests that the
lower market concentration in the post-1990 sample is associated with more ﬁrms adopting
the “low exchange pass-through” policy, and hence a lower average pass-through in the
industry.
28To be precise, we use gii
t = 1/L∗ PL∗
ℓ=1 gii
ℓt for i = 0,1; and as initial condition we use the steady-state expression






. We veriﬁed that the initial
condition only affects substantially the ﬁrst couple of years, and after that, the path of Λt is virtually independent
of the initial condition. In the results reported we eliminate the ﬁrst 4 years to minimize the impact of the initial
condition.
29Including the level of the Herﬁndahl index in the probability function created problems in the convergence of
the SEM algorithm. Therefore, we examine the results for the difference of the variable.
21[Figure 1 about here.]
5.2.2 Exporting Country Market Share
Secondly, we consider the total market share of an exporting country as a factor in the de-
termination of the pricing policies. The importance of this factor in the presence of strategic
interactions, has been studied by Feenstra et al. (1996), Bodnar et al. (2002) and Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2005). The third column of Table 3 shows that the country share variable
is a signiﬁcant determinant of both of the conditional probabilities, g00
ℓt and g11
ℓt . Moreover,
the estimates of the conditional probabilities imply that a ﬁrm in the LPT regime will stay in
that regime on average for 3.06 years, whereas the duration in the HPT regime is only 1.81
years.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 shows the country market shares and the percentage of ﬁrms in the LPT state
implied by equation (14). Germany, Korea, Sweden, UK and Japan in the post-1995 sample
display a systematic positive relationship between the market share and the implied percent
of ﬁrms in the LPT regime. Germany, Korea , Sweden and UK have an upward trend in their
market shares in the corresponding period whereas Japan post-1995 has a downward trend.
On the other hand, France, Italy and Japan in the pre-1995 period show a systematically
negative relation between market shares and percentage of ﬁrms in the state LPT.
The results for Japan pre-1995, Germany, Korea, Sweden and the UK, resemble the em-
pirical ﬁndings in Feenstra et al. (1996), whose estimates imply that pass-through increases
with country market share when market share is already large (i.e. we expect a negative
relation between the percent of LPT ﬁrms and the country market share), and it decreases
with market share when it is small (i.e. in this case we expect a positive relation). Japan
pre-1995 has a large market share of about 66% and we ﬁnd an inverse relation between
changes in its market share and the implied percent of Japanese ﬁrms in the LPT state;
whereas Germany, Korea, Sweden and the UK have market shares of less than 16% and
display a positive relation.30
Since all countries, except for Japan, have small shares of the US automobile market,
the propensity to choose a low degree of pass-through decreases for the ﬁrms in those
30As a matter of reference, Feenstra et al. (1996) calculate a negative relation between market shares and pass-
through for a market share less that 40% in the Swedish car exports to Canada and a positive relation for a market
share above 40%.
22countries. The implications for the average pass-through can be drawn by looking at the
total fraction of ﬁrms in the LPT regime. Panel (H) in Figure 2 shows a downward trend in
the estimated mass of ﬁrms in the LPT regime up until 2000. These results may be driven
by the Japanese country share dynamics, given their dominant share in the market.
5.2.3 Monetary Stability
The last set of factors that we consider relate to monetary stability in the importing and
exporting countries. Taylor (2000) shows that stable inﬂation rates affect the degree to
which ﬁrms pass-through ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate to their prices by reducing their
pricing power. Similarly, Devereux et al. (2004) show, in a general equilibrium framework,
that the ﬁrms optimally set prices in the currency of the country that has more stable money
growth; this result is based on a similar condition to the condition (9) derived as special case
of our theoretical setup in Section 2. Hence, the models in Taylor (2000), Devereux et al.
(2004) and the setup in Section 2 imply that if the importing country has relatively low and
stable inﬂation rates, more exporting ﬁrms will set their prices in the importing country’s
currency, and as a result, the importing country will experience a lower pass-through.31
We include inﬂation rates of both countries as explanatory variables in the probability
functions as well as a measure of the volatility of the exchange rate. The column “inﬂation”
in Table 3 shows the results for the speciﬁcation with transition probabilities as functions
of the US inﬂation rate and the inﬂation rate in the exporter country. While the variable US
inﬂation (rows Z1 in Table 3) is signiﬁcant in the transition probability of the LPT regime, the
inﬂation rate of the exporting country is not signiﬁcant. Similar to the previous speciﬁcation,
the expected duration of the LPT regime is longer: they are 3.54 and 2.34 years, respectively
for the LPT and HPT regimes.
Figure 3 shows that the reduction in the US inﬂation rates imply an increase the fraction
of ﬁrms in the low pass-through regime. This is consistent with the idea that increased
monetary stability in the US has lead the exporters to pass-through less of the exchange
rate ﬂuctuations, contributing to a decline in the pass-through.32
31In a setup similar to Devereux et al. (2004), Goldberg and Tille (2005) contrast the role of that macroeconomic
conditions to industry speciﬁc features for the ﬁrms’ optimal choice of currency. They show that macroeconomic
variability matters for the ﬁrms’ decisions if their products are highly differentiated. In industries with high elas-
ticities of demand, the ﬁrms tend to herd together in the choice of currency rather than basing their decisions on
macroeconomic conditions.
32Using aggregate prices Marazzi et al. (2005) also ﬁnd a steady decline in the exchange-rate pass-through in US
automotive products since the 1980s using rolling regressions.
23[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
The last column in Table 3 shows our estimates for the model with the volatility of the
exchange rate. The volatility of the exchange rate is highly signiﬁcant in the high pass-
through regime. As shown in Figure 4, there is a negative relationship between the volatility
of the exchange rate and the fraction of ﬁrms in the low pass-through regime. During periods
of high volatility, ﬁrms tend to pass-through more of the ﬂuctuations. The reduction in the
volatilities towards the end of our sample imply a higher fraction of ﬁrms adopting low pass-
through (see Panel H in Figure 4). Hence, one could argue that lower exchange rate volatility
has lead the average pass-through to decline.
6 Implications for the Exchange Rate Pass-Through Dy-
namics
To study the implications of our estimates for the evolution of the exchange rate pass-
through in the automobile industry, we aggregate the individual prices in a price index.





where ωℓ is the weight associated with the car model ℓ, and ^ pℓt follows the pricing policy in
(12). Let I0
ℓt be an indicator function equal to one if the ﬁrm ℓ is in the low pass-through
regime in period t and zero otherwise. Following our deﬁnition of exchange rate pass-through
at the ﬁrm level in equation (11), from the price index and the pricing policy (12) it follows
that the empirical exchange rate pass-through coefﬁcient for the industry is33
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24Next, using the implied mass of ﬁrms in the LPT state given by Λt in equation (14), we
compute the aggregate pass-through coefﬁcient at time t as
ηt = Λt(βs





1 + βψ). (15)
Table 4 presents a general speciﬁcation that includes market concentration, exporting
country’s market share, inﬂation differential and the exchange rate volatility as the determi-
nants of the transition probabilities. We calculate the aggregate exchange rate pass-through
based on this general speciﬁcation and equation (15).
[Table 4 about here.]
To understand the contribution of each factor driving the transition probabilities in the
variation of the exchange rate pass-through, we perform the following experiment. First we
calculate the year-to-year variation in the implied pass-through coefﬁcient from our general
speciﬁcation (Table 4); then, we compute the year-to-year variation that one obtains when
the variation in only one factor (among market concentration, exporting country’s market
share, inﬂation differential and the exchange rate volatility) is included in the estimated
transition probabilities, and the other factors are kept at their average values. With this,
we obtain a measure of the contribution of each factor in the year-to-year variation of the
aggregate exchange rate pass-through. Then we repeat the experiment for different horizons.
The results of our decomposition are presented in Table 5.
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 shows that country market share has a minimal contribution (of less than 2%)
to the variations in exchange rate pass-through. On the other hand, changes in the mar-
ket concentration, inﬂation differential and exchange rate volatility all have sizable effects.
Market concentration, measured by changes in the Herﬁndahl index explain about 40% of
the year-to-year variations in the exchange rate pass-through coefﬁcient; the cross-country
inﬂation differential explains about 22%; and the volatility of the exchange rate explains
about 37%. In a ﬁve year horizon, the percentage due to market concentration falls to 17%,
whereas, the percentage due to the exchange rate volatility increases to 53%. The contribu-
tion of inﬂation does not change by much.
25One needs to be careful in interpreting these decomposition results since they are ob-
tained in a partial equilibrium framework. In a general equilibrium model, there may be
clear interactions and feedback mechanisms between the exchange rate volatility and the the
cross-country inﬂation differentials or between the country market shares and the degree
of market concentration. By the nature of the exercise, we abstract from such endogenous
relationships.
7 Conclusions
We investigate the changes in the pricing policies and the exchange rate pass-through deci-
sions of automobile ﬁrms exporting to the US. To that end, we set up and estimate a regime
switching model of export pricing, where the changes in the pricing regimes are governed
by a Markov process. The transition probabilities of the Markov process depend on both
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. We estimate our model using data on 35 au-
tomobile models imported to the US from seven countries in the period 1980-2004. As our
estimations show, the pricing policy characterized by a lower exchange rate pass-through
also implies a lower sensitivity to misalignments in the ﬁrm’s relative price. Furthermore,
the low pass-through pricing policy we identify is associated with periods of low volatility of
demand and technology shocks, and our estimates indicate that the adoption of such policy
has a longer duration than the adoption of the policy characterized by a higher exchange
rate pass-through.
From our estimation results, we conclude that both microeconomic and macroeconomic
factors are important in the pricing policy determination. While changes in the Herﬁndahl
index of the industry are positively associated with the propensity to be in a low pass-
through regime, the inﬂation rate in the US and the exchange rate volatility are negatively
correlated to such propensity. Our results highlight the fact that in the recent decades,
there has been some structural changes in the pricing policies of exporters based on a
number of factors. Therefore, it is constructive to study the pass-through phenomenon
at a disaggregated level to understand the reasons behind its decline. We conclude that,
for the automobile industry, variations in the aggregate exchange rate pass-through can
be attributed to enhanced monetary stability in the US, as well as the decreased market
concentration in the industry.
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30Figure 1: Market Concentration & Percent of Firms in LPT State
A) Herﬁndahl Index








B) Percentage of Firms in LPT state & Change in Herﬁndahl Index

















Panel A shows the Herﬁndahl index for the automobile industry. Panel B shows the percent
of ﬁrms in the “low pass-through” (LPT) state calculated with the equation (14) and the
estimations in the column 2 of Table 3. We dropped the ﬁrst four years to minimize the
impact of the initial conditions.
For Panel B: –+– percentage of ﬁrms in LPT (left scale); — change in Herﬁndahl index (right
scale).
31Figure 2: Exporter’s Country Market Share & Percent of Firms in LPT State
A) France B) Germany
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The percent of ﬁrms in the “low pass-through” (LPT) state is calculated with the equation (14) and the es-
timations in the column 3 of Table 3. We dropped the ﬁrst four years to minimize the impact of the initial
conditions.
–+– percentage of ﬁrms in LPT (left scale) ; — exporter’s country market share (right scale) 32Figure 3: US inﬂation & Percent of Firms in LPT State



















The percent of ﬁrms in the “low pass-through” (LPT) state is calculated with the equation (14) and the es-
timations in the column 4 of Table 3. We dropped the ﬁrst four years to minimize the impact of the initial
conditions.
–+– percentage of ﬁrms in LPT (left scale) ; — US inﬂation rate (right scale)
33Figure 4: Exchange Rate Volatility & Percent of Firms in LPT State
A) France B) Germany
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The percent of ﬁrms in the “low pass-through” (LPT) state is calculated with the equation (14) and the es-
timations in the column 5 of Table 3. We dropped the ﬁrst four years to minimize the impact of the initial
conditions.




















































































Note 1 (notation): η is the price elasticity of demand; η1 is the derivative of price elasticity w.r.t. pℓ/PL; η2 is the
derivative of price elasticity w.r.t. the element y of the vector Yℓ; γx is the elasticity of the price p∗
ℓ w.r.t. x.





∂ψℓ , this is a simplifying assumption but we can
also assume
∂pL




∂e this amounts to assume that the
size of importers is large enough in the sector, however we can also assume that the fraction of importers is small
enough so that even though
∂p∗
ℓ
∂e ≥ 0 we can still approximate
∂pL










Note 3 (approximation of elasticities): The γs in the upper panel that deﬁne the ωs are the non-linear elasticities
of the optimal price p∗
ℓ w.r.t. the corresponding element; the approximations in the lower panel assume that the
coefﬁcients in the linear price p∗
ℓ approximate the non-linear elasticities.
35Table 2: Car Models in Sample
Model† Brand country Assembly Plant Sample FTZ†† Average Import††
Alfa Spider Italy Pininfarina, Italy 1980-1994
Audi A6 Germany Ingolstadt, Germany 1983-2004
BMW Series 3 Germany Munich, Germany 1980-2004
BMW Series 5 Germany Dingolﬁng, Germany 1980-2004
BMW Series 7 Germany Dingolﬁng, Germany 1980-2004
Honda Prelude Japan Sayama, Japan 1980-2001
Huyndai Elantra Korea Ulsan, Korea 1992-2004
Huyndai Sonata Korea Asan, Korea (93-04) 1989-2004
Jaguar XJ6 UK Birmingham, UK 1980-2004
Mazda 323 Japan Hiroshima, Japan 1980-1994
Mazda Prot´ eg´ e Japan Hiroshima, Japan 1990-2003
Mercedes 300E Germany Sindelﬁngen, Germany 1980-1999
Mercedes 560SEL Germany Sindelﬁngen, Germany 1984-2004
Mitsubishi Diamante Japan Nagoya, Japan 1992-2004
Mitsubishi Mirage Japan Okazaki, Aichi, Japan 1987-2001
Nissan 300ZX Japan Oppama, Japan 1984-1996
Nissan Maxima Japan Oppama, Japan 1982-2004
Peugeot 505 France Aulnay, France 1980-1991
Porsche 911 Germany Zuffenhausen, Germany 1981-2004
Porsche 928 Germany Zuffenhausen, Germany 1980-1995
Saab 900 Sweden TrollhAttan, Sweden 1980-2004
Saab 9000S Sweden TrollhAttan, Sweden 1990-2004
Subaru Impreza Japan Ota City, Japan 1993-2004
Subaru Loyale Japan Ota City, Japan 1980-1993
Toyota Celica Japan Tahara, Japan 1980-1997
Toyota Cresida Japan Tahara, Japan 1980-1992
Volvo C70 Sweden Uddevalla, Sweden 1994-2004
VW Passat Germany Emden, Germany 1990-2004
Honda Accord Japan Marysville, Ohio 1980-2004 46B 70%
Honda Civic Japan East Liberty, Ohio 1980-2002 46D 27%
Mazda 626 Japan Flat Rock, Michigan 1980-1993 70I 30%
Mitsubishi Galant Japan Normal, Illinois 1985-1996 114C 38%
Nissan Sentra Japan Smyrna, Tennessee (91-94) 1983-1994 78A 42%
Toyota Camry Japan Georgetown, Kentucky 1984-2000 29E 35%
Toyota Corolla Japan Fremont, California 1980-1997 18B 50%
†The series were constructed using predecessor and successors of the models listed above.
††FTZ is the Foreign Trade Zone number for those models with assembly plant in the US. Average Import is
the average dollar value of imported inputs as percentage of the total value of imported and domestic inputs
reported by the FTZ.
36Table 3: Parameter Estimates
Speciﬁcation of the Probability Equation (variables in vector Z):
constant market concentration country share inﬂation volatility of exch.rate
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
Parameters in Pricing Equation












































































































































Average Duration LPT 2.73 2.25 3.06 3.54 2.63
Average Duration HPT 2.50 2.07 1.81 2.34 2.60
Log-likelihood 539.3208 545.3112 550.9166 536.6366 548.1131
Obs. 583 583 583 583 583
RMSE 0.0788 0.0787 0.0783 0.0785 0.0788
AIC -4.8946 -4.8865 -4.8968 -4.8841 -4.8845




1 5.9580 4.0168 3.3380 8.0022 8.5722








1 0.5752 2.7736 1.1116 5.1386 2.0180
Notes:
• Each of the columns correspond to the speciﬁcation where the transition probabilities are functions of that particular
factor (Z1) and a constant. In the “inﬂation” speciﬁcation, Z1corresponds to the US inﬂation and Z2 corresponds to the
inﬂation rate of the exporting country.
• Each of the speciﬁcations also includes automobile-line speciﬁc ﬁxed effects.
• In the last two rows, the likelihood ratio statistics for the equality of the pass-through coefﬁcients across the regimes,
and the equality of US income and marginal cost coefﬁcients are reported. For a p-value of 0.05, the corresponding
chi-square value is 3.84 and 5.99, respectively.
37Table 4: General Speciﬁcation
Pricing Equation Parameters
Exchange Rate Surprise Industry Price Index Marginal Cost Income





















constant market concentration country share













inﬂation differential volatility of the exch. rate









Duration LPT Duration HPT
2.4893 2.0801
Log-likelihood Obs. RMSE AIC
566.1687 583 0.0787 -4.8628
Notes:
• The speciﬁcation includes ﬁxed effects that are constrained to be the same across the two regimes.
• Inﬂation differential is deﬁned as the difference between the Us inﬂation rate and the exporting country’s
inﬂation rate.
38Table 5: Decomposition of the Variations in the Exchange Rate Pass-through
horizon country share market concentration inﬂation differential volatility of exchange rate
k=1 1.7862 39.7625 21.7776 36.6737
k=2 -0.8075 36.0701 34.8364 29.9010
k=3 0.9296 20.5816 30.4865 48.0023
k=4 -0.1293 22.5110 22.8341 54.7842
k=5 1.6127 17.2551 28.0538 53.0784
Notes:
• Each row reports the percent of the k-year variation in the exchange rate pass-through
due to the different variables mentioned.
• The exchange rate pass-through elasticity is calculated with equation (15) and the es-
timations in Table 4. The ﬁrst 4 year were dropped to minimize the impact of initial
conditions.
39